The Oregon Court of Appeals has again enforced an arbitration clause in an employment contract, rejecting the employee's claim that the clause is unconscionable. In Livingston v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, the plaintiff, a pediatrician, took issue with the conduct of his employer and other doctor members and employees related to an investigation of the clinic's child vaccine program. He alleged he was ultimately terminated because of the concerns he expressed to his employer and government authorities.
Plaintiff filed common law and statutory employment claims against his employer and the others in court. The employer moved to abate the claims and compel arbitration, citing a clause in the employment agreement that required arbitration of "[a]ny controversy, dispute or disagreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof." The trial court denied the employer's motion, ruling that the arbitration clause is "unconscionable" and, therefore, unenforceable. The employer appealed, and the Court of Appeals last week agreed with the employer and sent the case back for arbitration of all claims.
The test for "unconscionability" in Oregon has two parts, one procedural and the other substantive. A contract is procedurally unconscionable, and therefore not enforceable, if there is "oppression" or "surprise" in the "conditions of contract formation," but unequal bargaining power alone is insufficient for a finding of procedural unconscionability. A contract is substantively unconscionable if the "terms" of the contract are "unreasonably" one-sided, such that their "effect" makes the parties' respective obligations "so unbalanced as to be unconscionable."
In this case, Plaintiff did not contend that the agreement was procedurally unconscionable; the Court of Appeals noted that, in any event, because plaintiff is a highly educated physician, any inequality in bargaining power was minimal. The trial court, however, had found these aspects of the agreement substantively unconscionable: (1) the possibility that plaintiff would have to pay defendant's attorney fees and costs if plaintiff is unsuccessful on his "blacklisting" claim; (2) excessive arbitration fees assessed against plaintiff; (3) ambiguity about which set of American Arbitration Association rules would govern the arbitration; and (4) a requirement of confidentiality. Before the Court of Appeals, plaintiff asserted these and other grounds for a finding of unconscionability and further argued that the arbitration clause should not apply to intentional torts, statutory claims, and claims against non-signatories to the employment agreement. The Court of Appeals addressed the trial court's findings as well as the other arguments put forth by plaintiff, and held that none of the concerns arises to the level of substantive unconscionability or otherwise requires court litigation of the parties' disputes. Central to the ruling of the Court of Appeals is the very broad language of the arbitration clause allowing for arbitration of "any controversy, dispute or disagreement."